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These three pieces look at different aspects of Dappled World in a serious and careful 
way, and I am very grateful to the authors for their comments. I am almost entirely in 
agreement with Peter Lipton. Occasionally I overstate the case for the dappled world. 
That’s because the vision of a dappled world delights me. With Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
I love “all things counter, original, spare, strange”1. It is also because many take the 
alternative “fundamentalist” world to be the only reasonable view consistent with the 
successes of modern science. So it is important to state the arguments for dappling in the 
strongest terms possible.  
 
My own assessment of the pros and cons is essentially Lipton’s. The case is still out. I, 
though, would bet that matters will remain that way for a very very long time. These are 
grand metaphysical issues and so long as we are loyal to our empiricist strictures we are 
likely not to find answers to them. I engage in metaphysics myself primarily for 
methodological reasons. The image of a world unified under the universal rule of law has 
a powerful grip; it influences scientific decisions that should instead be made entirely on 
their empirical merit.   
 
My resistance to metaphysics makes me disappointing to both Laurie Paul and Peter 
Menzies, who look for answers to a number of metaphysical questions that I remain silent 
about.  Paul asks, How are objects and properties related? Are objects collections of 
properties; or is there some substantial substratum; or …? This is an important issue but I 
have nothing to say about it. As with all metaphysical issues, there are a number of views 
on offer, some better then others, all with some problems. I do not think that my views 
about dappling add to these problems in any significant way – you can add them to your 
favourite metaphysics of substance, accident, object and property.   
 
The metaphysical view I defend is about laws. Many of our most well-confirmed law 
claims in the exact sciences ascribe capacities to properties2. For example, “A mass of 
magnitude m brings with it a capacity of magnitude Gm/r2 to cause another mass a 
distance r away to move towards it.”  They also tell us, derivatively, what capacities an 
object or structure has by virtue of having the designated property. Because the property 
ensures the associated capacity, there are a variety of things an object will do by virtue of 
having that property – for instance, attract other objects with masses; there are a variety 
of things it can do by virtue of having the property – such as cause another object to 
move in a near elliptical orbit around itself when other causes of motion are negligible; 
                                                 
1 Hopkins, “Pied Beauty”. 
2 Perhaps when Paul says, citing  p. 81, I see objects as collections of properties or structures (which I at 
least did not intend to say), it is because she supposes that laws assign natures or capacities to objects and 
hence infers this view about objects from my claim there that “we [as opposed to Aristotle] assign natures 
not to substances but rather to collections or configurations of properties, or structures”.  
and there are also outcomes it can contribute to – such as holding a feather in midair, in 
conjunction with a vigorous updraft.  
 
Are capacities additional properties that the object has whenever it has the designated 
property? This is again a question whose answer is not central to my main theses. I do 
have views about it, but these should be separable from the main theses about the extent 
of law in nature.   
 
I personally find it impossible to understand the distinction between occurrent properties 
and dispositions or causal powers.3 So I am inclined to say that there just are properties. 
Sometimes we refer to them using “occurrent property” language; but sometimes by a 
capacity or power word – often when we wish to highlight either some specific way of 
finding out that the property obtains or some specific effects an object can produce in 
virtue of having that property. As Paul notes, I think this proposal fits nicely with 
Shoemaker’s account of properties and powers. If I am right, it is like cases Rudolf 
Carnap discusses. We express the distinction in the material mode, but it would be more 
perspicuously cast in the formal mode.      
 
Paul also asks if the having of certain capacities by certain properties is a primitive 
necessary connection. That depends on how one thinks about laws of nature. When I say 
“It is in the nature of, say, mass to attract other masses”, I mean to imply that this is a law 
of nature – though not in the regularity sense of law. Again, I am disappointing from the 
metaphysicist’s point of view. I have nothing to say about what makes a law a law, 
except to protest that most law claims in exact science will not come out true if we see 
laws as regularities, or counterfactual regularities or “necessary” regularities among what 
are conventionally labelled “occurrent” properties.  
 
When I say that the connection is “brute fact” that is not to deny that it holds reliably, nor 
that it would hold counterfactually4. Rather I mean to deny that it holds by definition of 
the property. Scholastic philosophy hoped to find the “true” definitions of properties from 
which all other reliable facts about them would follow. This project seems not to work. 
Now we characterize our properties loosely, and have a great deal to say about how they 
will behave that does not follow from any definition.   
 
So I have, unfortunately perhaps, nothing of interest to offer about what an object is, what 
a property is, what a capacity is or what a law is. My views that laws associate capacities 
                                                 
3 I also have no metaphysical views about dispositions versus capacities versus powers. I choose the word 
“capacity” since it is less often used by others; hence it carries fewer presuppositions with it. (I do note in 
Dappled World that one conventional view of dispositions, the view that ties them to a single 
manifestation, is too narrow for capacities, which are more like Gilbert Ryle’s “generic dispositions” or 
what Menzies calls “multi-track”.) 
4 A connection between a property and a capacity need not hold absolutely reliably. It may hold only in 
certain circumstance, or with certain probability, or possibly sometimes, sometimes not. I take it that it is 
the job of science to spell this out for us. The associations I have studied most intensively in physics all 
seem to be universal; those in social science are more likely to be relative to certain institutional and 
political arrangements. 
to properties should be consistent with a variety of different answers to these 
metaphysical questions. 
 
There are two issues of concern to Paul that I do have views about: repeatability and 
realism. Paul asks, “Why aren’t capacities expressed all the time, even in unrepeatable 
circumstances?” There is one immediate answer. Some capacities need triggering; some 
capacities express themselves only in circumscribed circumstances; some express 
themselves only probabilistically; perhaps some in a haphazard manner.  
 
Another answer depends on what we mean by “express”. For many capacities, we have a 
word that describes their operation whether or not the canonical result is achieved. For 
instance, one mass can attract another, even if the second does not move. Other such 
words are repel, pull, damn, brake, harden (as in steel),…  Very often a capacity will 
operate under any circumstances, even those not favourable for achieving its canonical 
effect (or operate always when triggered, or always in certain kinds of circumstances).  
Masses seem to be like that; they always attract each other. If we see attraction as the 
expression of the capacity of the mass, then the expression of the capacity is repeated 
across different circumstances. Moreover, it would be repeated in circumstances that for 
some reason or another are never repeated.  
 
We may, on the other hand, think of the expression of the capacity as what ultimately 
happens, described in the language of occurrent properties. Does the second object move 
or not, and how? In this case we have a different question about repeatability. For every 
situation in which a capacity obtains and an outcome o eventuates, is there some 
description, D, of that situation such that whenever D is satisfied, o results? A “yes” 
answer is supported by the assumption that there are always metaprinciples that tell when 
a capacity operates and further metaprinciples (principles of compositions) that fix what 
happens under any arrangement of capacities and any concrete interferences. A “no” 
answer gives us what Peter Lipton calls “anomalous dappling”, which is the view that I 
propose.  
 
I advocate anomalous dappling. But I agree with everything that Lipton says when he 
asks, “Why believe in anomalous dappling?” The evidence is not compelling either way. 
That is why I urge us not to allow a metaphysical conviction on this issue, one way or 
another, to affect our strategies for future research or our assessment of the acceptability 
of proposed scientific hypotheses and policies. Lipton describes my methodological 
advice as “Construction and Autonomy”. Again, I agree with his characterization and 
with his claim. One can reasonably advocate construction and autonomy if one is a 
fundamentalist and even the anti-fundamentalist should expect many of our better 
theories to stretch further than their current boundaries. That is why I urge that research 
proposals be judged on their actual detailed promise5. I am, however, less sanguine than 
Lipton about the possibility of bringing reasonable metaphysical arguments to bear. 
Indeed, I am doubtful about the practical effectiveness of any of our arguments against 
takeovers by a single discipline or method or theory. Consider just a few of the most 
well-known: the Theory of Everything in physics, the gene program in biology, 
                                                 
5 Plus of course some cost/benefit analysis. 
evolutionary psychology and game theory. These all, I believe, get disproportionate 
attention and funding just because of their promise to be universal.6 
 
The one thing I can say to Paul and Lipton against repeatability and in favour of 
anomalous dappling is to remind them of the arguments in Dappled World that look at 
how our successful models work in exact science. Across a very wide range of physics 
theories, I argue, central terms (like “force” or the tensor of general relativity) are used as 
abstract terms: They always need some one or another from a handful of more concrete 
descriptions to obtain before they can be properly applied. These are the descriptions 
supplied by our bridge principles. I call them “interpretive models”.  
 
For instance, we can legitimately employ a description of a system as subject to a force 
Gm/r2 only if it is a massive object located a distance r from another mass of magnitude 
m; we can employ εq/r2 only to a charged object located a distance r from a charge of 
magnitude q; and so forth. The same, I claim is true for quantum theory, quantum 
electrodynamics, quantum field theory, classical electricity and magnetism, statistical 
mechanics, and probably many other theories in physics. This gives us a clear 
delimitation of the boundaries of these theories. A theory stretches only so far as its 
interpretive models fit.  
 
Economics theories face the same kind of constraints, but for different reasons. They use 
not abstract but rather highly concrete concepts. But they do not have a lot of principles 
available about how these concrete concepts behave. This makes it difficult to produce 
rigorous derivations of the kind that economists demand. My investigations suggest that 
we manage to get deductive proofs in models in economics by adding a lot of further 
specific assumptions to make up for the lack of general principles. These are often 
(misleadingly to my mind) called “idealizing assumptions”. These assumptions tend to be 
true of at best very limited economic situations. So, as in physics, the models again do 
not look on the face of it as if they fit a very wide range of real world situations. 
 
I assume that Lipton, in the spirit of his other claims, would respond that the evidence 
one way or another about how far these models really fit, independent of our knowledge 
of it, is not conclusive. Again I would agree. The evidence against fundamentalism in 
physics or economics or elsewhere is not compelling. Nor is the evidence in its favour. 
The world may be dappled after all, or it may not be.  
 
Lipton has another worry about repeatability. If, as I urge, we get regular outcomes only 
when a situation is shielded then we will get few regularities indeed since perfect 
shielding is rare. Yet again I agree with Lipton. Where shielding is imperfect, we cannot 
expect perfect regularities. But it seems to be a fact about the world that, where there are 
principles of composition for the different capacities at work, if the disturbances are 
small, the principles are approximately satisfied. What this amounts to in a given 
situation will depend on the concrete details, as will the question of whether a given 
                                                 
6 We do here, of course, also have to allow for human competences. It may be reasonable to fund a 
programme which we know we can carry out well over one with slightly more promise that we can not 
carry out properly.  
factor counts as a small disturbance or not. In some cases the exactly predicted behaviour 
will result most of the time, but there will be exceptions; in other cases the results will 
hover around the predicted behaviour; and so forth.  
 
These are matters that are often well understood in specific cases. A small virus can 
produce a large disturbance to the regular functioning of an organism; whereas a fairly 
large shove may have little effect on a heavy machine. We may ask what kind of fact it is 
that we understand when we understand that a given factor constitutes a small or a large 
disturbance. Do we not need some kind of law to determine this? I do not see why. We 
successfully shield against disturbances all the time; we make calculations about how 
much shielding is likely to be enough and we are very often right. Very often these 
calculations are not based on laws at all, but on knowledge expressed directly in the 
vocabulary of shielding and disturbance. I do not see why nature must speak a different 
language from us. 
 
Let us return now to Paul and her concern about realism and universality. She is right 
that my views are consistent with realism because our claims ascribing capacities to 
properties might well be true. As she says, these connections “exist independently of 
anything pragmatic”. She is also right in her suggestion that repeatability can be secured 
“in some way that is independent of human interest”. That is true for both senses of 
“repeatability”. If it is repetition of the outcome that is at stake, that can happen whenever 
there is appropriate shielding; and nature can – and does – build her own shields without 
our help. If it is repeatability of the expression of a capacity that we want, then, as we 
have seen above, that may be fairly widespread. So the commitment to anomalous 
dappling and the reasons for it need not carry one far “towards the antirealist camp”.  
 
Peter Menzies is particularly concerned with the metaphysics of capacities. What makes a 
capacity claim true? My simple answer, Tarski-style: “x has the capacity to r (in response 
to stimulus C)” is true iff x does have the capacity to r…  This will seem satisfactory only 
if we suppose that capacity is an unproblematic enough notion to figure on the right-
hand-side. That is what I argue, both in The Dappled World and in Nature’s Capacities 
and their Measurement. There are no special kinds of problems that beset causal 
concepts, including those having to do with capacities, that do not equally beset whatever 
may be your favourite choice for “okay” concepts – measurable properties, “occurrent” 
properties, “intrinsic” properties, pure quantities,… Causal and capacity concepts have no 
special semantic, epistemic or ontological problems. 
 
Menzies himself admits that we do not need a reductive account of capacities. The three 
characteristics he attributes to them as part of an informative account are indeed ones I 
advocate. In Nature’s Capacities I say a lot more. This includes discussions of how we 
measure capacities, including both probabilistic and experimental methods; how 
capacities relate to John Stuart Mill’s tendencies; how they are represented and studied in 
“idealized” models; and how capacity claims relate both to what are more usually thought 
of as laws, both causal and associational, and to singular causal claims. Menzies asks, 
“How do we know that capacity claims are not multiply ambiguous, referring to different 
kinds of things?” We know that, I take it, by empirical research. This is the way we have 
found the world to be.  
 
Menzies own proposal is that “the truth condition for a capacity claim are explained in 
terms of a counterfactual about a stimulus response pair,” where “a multi-track capacity 
would be spelled out in terms of a battery of such counterfactuals”.  Then the truthmaker 
for the capacity claim is the intrinsic property that “grounds” the counterfactuals. 
 
I do not think this proposal will work. That is not because of the problems Menzies raises 
about the need for laws to flesh it out. I agree that there is not only the grounding 
property but a law as well. But the law connects the property with a capacity, not with a 
display of the capacity that can be described in the language of occurrent properties7.  
 
One problem in limiting ourselves to laws that associate the grounding property with a 
display of the capacity is a complicated one about knowing what we are testing in a 
controlled experiment. This problem is discussed in the chapter about Aristotelian natures 
in the Dappled World. Here I shall rehearse two more central worries. Both have to do 
with the open, or multi-track, nature of capacities.  
 
Counterfactuals are too weak to handle openness. My breakfast cereal box tells me, 
“Shredded Wheat can improve the health of your heart.” Or, when my daughter and I use 
a magnet to try to retrieve our earring from between the floorboards, we do so because 
the magnet may or might well lift the earring. Not only do we need funny modalities; we 
also have trouble specifying the exact responses. We say that the magnet might well lift 
the earring, but there may be no fact of the matter about the exact motion. Of course there 
will be if all causes of motion and all interferences can be represented as forces and 
forces always add vectorially8. But much of my argumentation should cast doubt on this. 
I think it goes far beyond our evidence. The overall conclusion I draw from both these 
considerations is that there is no way to refer to all of the varied responses and all of the 
various modal truths about them at once, except by describing the capacity on account of 
which they are true. 
 
My second objection is that, when we can, we should render law claims in science in a 
way that resembles what we actually tend to assert. I say, masses attract other masses or 
that skill loss during unemployment tends to perpetuate high unemployment rates. There 
are three standard ways to render these claims without using capacity language.  
 
One is as ceteris paribus laws: If nothing interferes, then … This has two drawbacks. 
First it includes the term “interference”, which for many is as abhorrent as “capacity”. 
We might hope to replace this by an “occurrent” property description. I am not sure that 
                                                 
7 If we think of an occurrent-property concept and a capacity concept as referring to one and the same 
thing, then we will read the law as telling us about the association of one capacity with another set of 
features that we have already associated together under the occurrent-property concept. 
8 Lipton says that I deny that there is a rule of composition for forces. On the contrary, I think we have 
good inductive evidence for vector addition. What I deny – or wish to remain agnostic about – is that there 
is a rule of composition for causes of motion, since these may not all be appropriately represented as 
forces, as well as for interferences that might undermine the principle f = ma.   
we can. In mechanics we have our best chance: “If no other force occurs, then …” This 
supposes that all causes of motion can be represented as forces. I have already explained 
why, because of the way “force’ is used in those very successes that argue most 
powerfully for the truth of mechanics, we should be suspicious of this claim. The second 
reason is less controversial. This rendering does not say anything about all those cases 
where interferences do occur and where we want to use these laws to help calculate the 
result. 
 
The second way is to assert that the characteristic response really is there after all. There 
are two versions of this strategy. One uses words like “attract” to describe the 
characteristic response. Here we employ a word referring to the successful operation or, 
in Paul’s words, “exercise” of a capacity instead of referring to the capacity itself. Surely 
this will not satisfy those who are unhappy with capacities to begin with.  
 
The other version assumes that the response, described in purely “occurrent” property 
language, obtains even if it does not look that way. People have mixed intuitions about 
motions. Is the stationary object suspended between the magnet and the earth both 
moving up and moving down?  Whatever we say in this case, the analogue is implausible 
in other cases. For instance, we know how to calculate the characteristics of a current in 
circuits from the capacities of the components to affect those characteristics, but the rules 
look nothing like addition. In fact, I know of only one case where this strategy is entirely 
plausible – in structural models in econometrics. There each capacity is represented in a 
separate equation; when different capacities act together, all the equations must be 
satisfied at once, so that the behaviour described in each and every equation will be 
obtain. 
 
The third way takes the laws as we use them and our metaprinciples of composition to be 
shorthand referring to an unending variety of complicated laws where all possible 
combinations of factors occur in the antecedent.  My objections to this are the ones I have 
already made to Menzies’s proposal involving a vast array of counterfactuals: I think 
neither the laws nor the counterfactuals exhaust the truths that capacities can produce. 
The point is that there is nothing wrong with capacities. We use capacity language in a 
coherent way all the time. We do not need to lose the power of capacity to language to 
convey truths about our world that reference to laws and counterfactuals cannot convey. 
 
Menzies urges not only that capacities supervene on counterfacts; he also says that I am 
wrong to deny that “all reality supervenes on the distribution of microphysical properties 
and relations.” My reasons for not adopting supervenience have nothing to do with a 
narrow focus on token-token identity, as Menzies suggests. I think, rather, if this 
incredibly strong thesis is to be countenanced, convincing arguments should be on offer; 
and I do not know any. Most of the effort in the literature is devoted to trying to 
formulate it correctly, not to defending it.  
 
The structure of thought seems much like that of Humeans vis-à-vis causality. We begin 
with the assumption that some properties – microphysical properties of microphysical 
systems – are okay. Then we challenge: How can we make sense of the rest? But there is 
no principled reason to admit the one at the cost of the other to begin with. As with causal 
concepts, concepts of other sciences or other theories have no special semantic, epistemic 
or ontological problems of a kind that do not beset the privileged properties.  
 
For most concrete instantiations of most laws of physics, the eliciting and shielding 
conditions cannot be described in the same theory as the law itself and indeed, generally 
features must be included that are not described in any known physics at all. Importantly, 
this is true of our most successful uses of laws that provide the evidence we need for 
belief in their truth. In the face of this, supervenience theses need strong evidence in their 
favour since exactly the reverse of supervenience is what we see in our best physics.  
 
Concepts from macrophysics and from various branches of technology and engineering 
are required in conjunction with those of ‘microphysics’ to obtain true law statements (in 
the usual, regularity or counterfactual sense of “law”). Why then should we expect that       
the requisite factors that do not come from microphysics supervene on those that do? 
Menzies asks about colour. The question needs a detailed empirical investigation that I 
have not carried out. So I shall restrict myself to a case that I have studied.  
 
In The Dappled World I give a number of examples of how quantum and classical 
concepts cooperate in producing accurate accounts of the kind that can convince us of the 
truth of quantum claims. Neither alone suffices. We must not be misled by familiar 
reconstructions of quantum theory that tell us that the quantum state provides 
probabilities for what values classical quantities will take on measurement, and that’s all. 
That principle is not often called into play in real models.  The connections between the 
two theories in the successful models I have studied are highly various. Sometimes 
quantum quantities cause classical, sometimes the reverse and sometimes there are local 
identifications. Nothing in any treatment I know, of either experimental tests or of any of 
our highly successful quantum technologies provides support for the reducibility, the 
eliminability, or the supervenience of classical concepts on those from quantum 
mechanics, nor the reverse. 
     
